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I. Introduction
In 1963, when William Prosser undertook the drafting of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement
Second"), he was on the edge of a new era of tort litigation.'
The subsequent ascendance of section 402A was based, no
doubt, on its adoption of strict products liability and the
recognition by courts and commentators that strict liability
promotes investment in product safety, fairly allocates the costs
of accidents, and reduces litigation transaction costs.2 Despite
the fact that Restatement Second has achieved the status of "sacred

t Michael Ciresi and Gary Wilson are partners in the Minneapolis office of
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi. They practice in the area of general litigation
including products liability law.
1. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle
Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1257 (1993).
2. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt.
a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 21.
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scripture," the American Law Institute ("ALl") has undertaken
its wholesale revision.3
The most monumental change in ALI's proposed revision
is its new definition of design defect. Section 2(b) of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Tentative Draft
("Tentative Draft") makes the existence of a reasonable alternative design the very essence of design defect:
[A] product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the
seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial
chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe.4
This definition places upon an injured consumer the burden of
proving that there was a "reasonable alternative design" available
to the defendant that would have prevented, or significantly
lessened, his or her injuries.5
The Reporters concede that the purpose of this proposed
change is to abolish strict liability for design defects. The new
standard is described in Comment c to Section 2(b) as that "also
used in administering the traditional reasonableness standard in
Thus, Tentative Draft No. 2 strives to bring
negligence."6
product liability design cases back to a rule of reasonableness.
It seeks to give the factfinder a framework within which to
understand and accept the exigencies of the process of designing, developing, and taking a product to market.
The Minnesota Supreme Court is years ahead of the ALI.
In Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing,7 the court recognized that
Minnesota's design defect standard embodies a reasonable care
balancing test, which focuses on the conduct of the manufacturer in choosing a particular design.8 Thus, the negligence-based
standard championed by ALI's revision already reigns in
Minnesota.

3. James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1513 (1992).
4. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2(b) (emphasis added).
5. Id. cmt. c.
6. Id.
7. 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982).

8. Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn. 1982).
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Minnesota has, however, adopted a more practical, flexible
negligence-based design defect theory. In Kallio v. Ford Motor
Co.,9 the court rejected the very requirement now promoted by
the new Restatement - that plaintiff show, in order to establish
a prima facie case of design defect, that there was a feasible
practical alternative design available1 °
Minnesota courts should remain faithful to Kallio. The
proposed Restatement's focus on the single element-whether a
reasonable alternative design has been shown by the plaintiff-is
not a "restatement" of a generally agreed upon legal rule."
More importantly, the reasonable alternative design test imposes
an unfair burden of evidentiary production on injured consumers and shifts the focus of any product liability lawsuit from
reality to speculation. The ultimate result of the proposed
Restatement, if it is adopted, will be to make it impossible for
some truly deserving plaintiffs to obtain compensation for
injuries caused by products. By barring such recoveries, the
proposed Restatement undercuts all of the policies that elevated
the Restatement Second to "sacred scripture" of products liability
law.
II.

What Does the New Restatement Restate?

The proposed Restatement bears the internal inconsistencies
of a work product that attempts to accommodate irreconcilable
interests. For example, the Tentative Draft appears at odds with
itself over the issue of whether manufacturers are liable, without
a showing of reasonable alternative design, for products that are
so dangerous as compared to their utility that they never should
have been marketed. Comment c to Section 2 opines that
absent proof of a reasonable alternative design, courts should
not impose liability based upon a conclusion that an entire
product category should not have been distributed in the first

9.
10.

407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987).
Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d, 92, 96-97 (Minn. 1987).

11. As shown below, there is real suspicion among some members of the bar that
the Restatement (Third) is not a "restatement," but is substantive tort reform under the
guise of "restating" the law. See Bruce S. Kaufman, Attorneys Spar Over Restatement (Third)
of Torts; ATLA to Mobilize Opposition Project, 22 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 436,
439 (Apr. 22, 1994); Larry S. Stewart, The ALI and Products Liability: "Restatement" or
"Reform"?, TRIAL, Sept. 1994, at 28, 30-31.
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instance.1 2 The Comment points to alcohol and tobacco as
examples of such products.13 According to the Comment,
control of these products should be left to the legislatures and
administrative agencies.14 However, the following Comment
goes on to suggest there can be liability absent the showing
required by Section 2(b) if a product poses an "extremely high
degree of danger ... [that] so substantially outweighs its
negligible utility that no rational adult.., would choose to use
or consume the product."1 5 The ironic example of such a
product given in Illustration No. 5-remembering that real
cigarettes are not to be considered such a product-is a prank
exploding cigar.1 6
There is also confusion concerning the reasonable alternative design standard. Is the sufficiency of plaintiffs proof a
matter to be decided by a court on a motion for summary
judgment or one for the jury? On one hand, Comment 1 e7
advises that "the rule is one addressed initially to the courts.
This suggests that the court decides, on a dispositive pretrial
motion, whether an injured consumer has met its burden
sufficiently to allow the jury to examine the issue. Illustrations
8 and 9 suggest that a directed verdict should be entered if
there is no showing of alternative design. 8 Comment e also
notes, however, that "the requirements in Section 2(b) relate to
what the plaintiff must prove in order to prevail at trial." 9 On
the other hand, however, the Comment then explains that the
ALI takes no position regarding the implications of these
requirements for purposes ofjudging the adequacy of pleadings
or pretrial demonstration of general issues of fact. 2° This
language suggests that the proposed Restatement sets no rule as
to whether a defendant can obtain summary judgment for a
plaintiffs failure to present evidence of a reasonable alternative

12. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. c.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. cmt. d.
16. Id. § 2 cmt. c, illus. 5. Minnesota law clearly allows liability without evidence
of an alternative design for products that "should be removed from the market rather
than be redesigned." Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 97 n.8.
17. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. e.
18. Id. illus. 8-9.
19. Id. § 2 cmt. e.
20. Id.
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design. Indeed,
the Comment states that the issue is left "to
21
local law."
The Minnesota Supreme Court has established that "local
law." In Kallio, the court resoundingly rejected a manufacturer's
argument that establishing a reasonable alternative design was
a pretrial hurdle blocking plaintiff's path to the jury.22 The
court found that requiring plaintiffs to prove an alternative
design "tends to elevate proof of the existence of a feasible
alternative safer design from a factor properly2 for jury consideration to an element of the plaintiffs claim." 1
Kallio is correct in this holding. As Comment e points out,
the question of whether a proposed design is a reasonable
alternative is laden with fact issues. 24 Among these are the
magnitude of foreseeable harm of the alternative design, any
potential warnings that could accompany it, consumer expectations, the effects of the design on the cost of production,
product longevity, aesthetics, and marketability.25 In Minnesota, these factual issues are for the jury; courts decide the
questions of law.26 Consequently, though the proposed Restatement is confused about the role of summary judgement in the
reasonable alternative design issue, Minnesota realizes that
whether a proposed design constitutes a "reasonable alternative
design" is a jury question.
III. Risk/Utility: Been There, Done That
The goal of the ALI's redefinition of design defect is to
amplify in the law a risk/utility standard. The perceived enemy
of the risk/utility standard is the "consumer expectation test,"
under which a product is deemed defective if it fails to perform
as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect. 27

Under that

standard, the plaintiff can recover "by resort to circumstantial
evidence, even when the accident itself precludes identification
of the specific defect at fault."2 8 As Professors Henderson and

21. Id.
22. Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 94-97.
23. Id. at 97.
24. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. e.
25. Id.
26. See Hughes v. Quarve & Anderson Co., 338 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Minn. 1983).
27. See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305-06 (Cal. 1994).
28. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978).
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Twerski point out in their prescient article in the Cornell Law
Review, risk/utility and consumer expectations are the competing
equations to decide whether a product is defectively designed.2 9
Henderson and Twerski make clear their distaste for the
consumer expectation test, describing it as "so open-ended and
unstructured that it provides almost no guidance to the jury in
determining whether a defect existed" and "leaves manufacturers uncertain of the law's demands regarding product design.'
Minnesota already has a risk/utility test for defective design.
Since 1977, Minnesota law has demanded that plaintiffs prove
not only that a product is defective, but that it is also "unreasonably dangerous" before it will be considered defectively designed."' In Bilotta v. Kelley Co.,3 2 the Minnesota Supreme
Court agreed that the jury must consider the conscious design
decision made by a manufacturer and can find that a design is
defective only if "the risk/utility balance struck by the manufacturer was ... not reasonable."33 According to Bilotta, the
determination of whether the manufacturer struck a reasonable
balance must be flexible: "What constitutes 'reasonable care'
will, of course, vary with the surrounding circumstances and will
involve 'a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity
of harm if it happens, against the burden of
the precaution
34
harm.'"
the
avoid
to
effective
be
would
which
Based on broad-brush legal reasoning, the proposed
Restatement adopts a much more rigid approach. 5 It collapses

29. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3 at 1534. The professors describe how,
while they were working on an article proposing revisions of section 402A, they learned
that the ALI had itself decided to revise the products liability sections. The professors
were then appointed Reporters for the revision.
30. Id.
31. See O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn.

1977).
32. 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984).
33. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984).
34. Id at 621 (citing Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn. 1982)).
35. The Reporters' conclusion that the risk/utility analysis always requires the

proof of a reasonable alternative design is based on five categories of cases, including
some cases that draw exceptions to the requirement of a reasonable alternative design,
some that allow proof of design defect by res ipsa loquitur inferences rather than proof
of an alternative design, and some that do not "explicitly" require proof of an
alternative design. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2,§ 2 Reporters' Note, to cmt. c.

The Reporters do not confront the fact that some cases in these categories, including
Ka!io, explicitly reject the rule that proof of an alternative design is a prima facie
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the risk/utility test into a single factor: Was there a reasonable
and safer alternative design at the time of the manufacture of
the product?3 6
Minnesota's approach is better. Requiring that a plaintiff
prove a reasonable alternative design as the only method of
establishing that a product is defectively designed throws courts
and juries into the realm of the hypothetical, places information
requirements on the party who can least efficiently satisfy them
and, as shown below, simply conflicts with other well-established
veins of Minnesota law. There is also a fairness concern. The
new formulation would obviously reduce the number of
plaintiffs who prevail in their design defect actions. In doing so,
not only would injured persons be left without compensation,
but the policies of product liability litigation would be left
unfulfilled.
TV.

Proving the Impossible: Welcome to Hypothetical
Litigation

Under Section 2(b), in order to establish that a reasonable
alternative design exists, plaintiff must prove a litany of facts
about what may well be a hypothetical design. Comment e
suggests that a plaintiff does not actually have to produce a
prototype design. 7 Thus, Section 2(b) anticipates that plaintiffs will introduce expert testimony about a design envisioned
by that expert, but not actually in existence. Comment e also
describes the numerous issues upon which the plaintiff must
offer testimony:
*
the instructions and warnings which might accompany
that design;
*
how that design will satisfy consumer expectations;
*
the cost of producing that alternative design;
*
the effect of that design on product function;
*
the effect of the design on product longevity;
*
the aesthetics of that proposed design; and
*
the marketability of that design.38
In addition, the plaintiff must prove that the hypothetical
alternative design would have eliminated or reduced the harm

element
36.
37.
38.

of a design defect case.
Id.
Tentative Draft, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. e.
Id.
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suffered by the plaintiff. 9 Placing the burden of production
of this information on the plaintiff makes no sense. It is the
manufacturer who has access to this information. In fact,
product manufacturers are obligated, under Minnesota law, to
keep informed about scientific knowledge and discoveries in the
field of their product. 4
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized long ago that
the manufacturer "stands in a superior position" to recognize
and cure defects.4 ' Forcing the plaintiff to collect and present
the evidence likely already in the hands of the manufacturer
42
threatens to turn discovery into a game of cat and mouse.
Moreover, nothing could be further from the goals underlying
product liability litigation of reducing transaction costs in the
litigation of products cases.43
The proposed Restatement presents an academic view of this
evidentiary burden that is out of touch with the realities of
complex product liability litigation. In order to offer proof of
the factors listed above, plaintiffs would have to employ numerous experts. A design expert, for example, would have to testify
concerning the feasibility of a design, a marketing expert would
have to testify concerning its marketability, and an economist
would be needed to opine on the cost of production.
This testimony, if it were available, would simply overwhelm
the trial. The other facts needed to recover for a design defect,
that the plaintiff was using the product and was injured by it, are
straightforward and relatively simple to prove.
Once the
plaintiffs case turns to proving the characteristics of a hypothetical design, however, the trial would be plunged into hypothetical
minutiae.

39. Id.
40. Omnetics v. Radiant Technology Corp., 440 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
41. Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn. 1982); see also Pietrone v.
American Honda Motor Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 137, 142 (Cal. App. 1987) ("[T]he
feasibility and cost of alternative designs ... involve[s] technical matters peculiarly
within the knowledge of the manufacturer."), review denied (Cal. May 21, 1987).
42. This imbalance in the availability of information has led many courts to hold
that, where a feasible alternative design is at issue, it is the defendant's burden to show
that its chosen design was the best feasible alternative. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co.
v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885-86 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,
445 (Cal. 1978).
43. See, e.g., G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-75 (1970).
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The Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, has soundly
In Mitchell v.
rejected such forays into the hypothetical.
Volkswagenwerk, A. G.," 4 the court discussed the doctrine asserted
in crashworthiness cases that a plaintiff must prove the injuries
that would have resulted absent a vehicle defect. This requirement is nearly identical to Section 2(b)'s proposal that plaintiff
prove that, if a manufacturer had used a different design, the
injuries would have been less or nonexistent. Discussing the
requirement, Judge Lay noted:
The primary difficulty we have with this analysis is that it
forces not only the parties but the jury as well to try a
Liability and damage questions are
hypothetical case.
difficult enough within orthodox principles of tort law
without extending consideration to a case of a hypothetical
victim. More realistically, the parties and juries should direct
their attentions to what actually happened rather than what
might have happened.45
Mitchell also expressed an institutional concern. Forcing the
plaintiff to prove a negative fact (i.e., no injuries with a different
design) threatens the integrity of legal process:
A rule of law which requires a plaintiff to prove . .. what
might have happened in lieu of what did happen requires
obvious speculation and proof of the impossible. This
approachconverts the common law rules governingprinciples of legal

causation into a morass of confusion and uncertainty.46

V. Admissibility of Reasonable Alternative Design Evidence
Manufacturers may want it both ways by requiring plaintiffs
to prove reasonable alternative design and then asserting that
the information required to show the hypothetical is not even
admissible. The admissibility of expert testimony in federal
court is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v.
4 7 Daubertrequires that any scientific
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
evidence ultimately admitted be "not only relevant, but reliAn expert's testimony must be based on scientific
able."'

44.
45.
46.

669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1205 (emphasis added).

47. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
48. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
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knowledge and must connote "more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation."49
In Stanczyk v. Black & Decke, Inc.,5" the court translated
what it viewed as the Daubertrequirements into the context of an
expert's testimony about a hypothetical alternative design.5 1 In
Stanczyk, the plaintiff was injured by a miter saw.52 Plaintiff's
expert testified that a design was possible that tightened the gap
through which the plaintiffs hand had slipped into the blade. 3
While the expert testified that he had done enough engineering
analysis to determine that the design was feasible, he conceded
that the construction of an actual prototype would actually
require "several hundred hours of engineering work." 4 The
court found, however, that Daubertrequired that the expert offer
a "testable" design and ruled the expert's testimony inadmissiAdditionally, the court suggested a requirement in
ble. 5
Daubert of peer review, and found essentially that under any peer
review requirement, all alternative designs except those used in
"industry practice" were inadmissible. 6
Minnesota courts have recognized - but refused to impose
upon a plaintiff - the burden created by any requirement that
a proposed alternative design be fully tested. The court of
appeals' opinion in Kallio describes how plaintiffs expert, in
order to test his alternative design for a truck transmission,
needed to test the design on up to 30 million vehicles in order
to meet statistical significance.
It was with this fact in mind
that the court of appeals found that proof of a reasonable

49. Id.
50. 836 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
51. Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 566 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 567.
54. Id.
55. Id. This aspect of Stanczyk, if adopted by other courts, would nullify the ALl's
position that "section 2(b) does not require the plaintiff to actually produce a
prototype." Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. e.
56. Stanczyk, 836 F. Supp. at 565, 567; see also Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany,
Inc., 650 So. 2d 385, 391 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (relying on Daubertto exclude testimony,
including that of an alternative reasonable design, by plaintiff's expert), reh'gdenied (La.
Mar. 14, 1995).
57. Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 391 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), affd,
407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987).
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alternative design was not necessary, a holding affirmed by the
supreme court.58
Obviously, the ALI did not fully consider the potential
evidentiary burdens when it urged that "[f]or justice to be
achieved, § 2(b) should not be construed to create artificial and
reasonable barriers to recover."59 Rather, the proposed standard places injured consumers between the proverbial rock and
a hard place by requiring proof that may not even be admissible.
VI.

The Resurection of the Standard of the Industry Defense
The Reporters take great pains to claim that manufacturers
cannot defeat a finding of defective design by showing that their
design is the industry standard.' ° There is a subtext to the
Comments, however, that recognizes both that a plaintiff will not
prevail if a manufacturer shows its design is the industry
standard, and that existing practices of a manufacturers' industry
will be the sole source of any alternative design evidence that a
plaintiff can muster. Illustration 3, for example, describes a
plaintiff's expert presenting a technological and economically
feasible alternative design that is "utilized in similar machinery."6" Illustration 7 provides an example where manufacturers
in one state use a reasonable alternative design that is not used
by a manufacturer from another state.62
The fate of the majority of plaintiffs under the proposed
Restatement will be that they can show, either for cost reasons or
under the prevailing evidentiary rules, only a feasible alternative
design that is already in use by a competing manufacturer.
These costs and evidentiary considerations will be reinforced by
the tendency of courts to hesitate indicting any existing design
which approximates the "standard" of an industry. In Elliott v.
Brunswick Corp.,6 for example, the court was asked to accept
what seems to be common sense: It is feasible to ask manufacturers of outboard motors to place a metal guard around the

58.
59.

Id. at 861, affd, 407 N.W.2d at 97.
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. e.

60. Id. cmL c.
61.
62.
63.

Id. cmt. d, illus. 3.
Id. illus. 7.
903 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991).
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motor's exposed blade.' 4 After noting that neither industry
custom or existing regulations required such a guard, the court
found itself incompetent to dictate a new design on the industry:
"We agree with Mercury that courts cannot burden companies
with an immediate duty to revolutionize their industry."65 Even
after noting that, in some uses, guards were placed on outboard
motor blades, 66 the court observed that "[a]s a general rule,
courts endeavor not to scapegoat manufacturers where challenged designs are 'in a state of flux' at the time of manufac-

ture."6 7
The Elliott court's hesitancy to dictate designs to manufacturers is echoed in Minnesota decisions, even where black letter
law allows, or may require, them to do so. In Buzzell v. Bliss,'
the plaintiff sought recovery after her fingers were amputated in
a punch press.6 9 The court refused the plaintiffs request to
present evidence of a safer design actually used in England, in
part because "[i]t was agreed by all experts at trial that the
standard in the industry in the United States is that the manufacturer leaves any point-of-operation protection to the user."70
Similarly, in Gross ex rel. Gross v. Running,7' a consumer
sought recovery after a towing hook ripped through a truck
frame rail and hit plaintiff in the head, causing severe brain
injury.7' The plaintiff proffered, as evidence of a feasible
alternative design, that the manufacturer could have created a
second hole on the vehicle's frame to allow safer attachment of
a tow hook.7 3 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, cancelling a
favor of plaintiff, because "no standard-sized tow
jury verdict in
74
hook exists."

64. Elliot v. Brunswick Corp., 903 F.2d 1505, 1507 (1 lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1048 (1991).
65. Id. at 1508.
66. Id. at n.2.
67. Id. at 1509 (citing Fincher v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 106, 114 (S.D. Miss.
1975), affd, 535 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1976)).
68. 358 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1985).
69. Buzzell v. Bliss, 358 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
70. Id.
71. 403 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. May 20, 1987).
72. Gross ex. rel. Gross v. Running, 403 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
73. Id. at 247.
74. Id.; see also Westbrock v. Marshalltown Mfg., 473 N.W.2d 352, 358 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) (recognizing a "safety device defense" where a multiple purpose product
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These court actions have forced a practical tendency for
plaintiffs to attempt to prove a reasonable alternative design by
recourse to existing standard designs. This tendency may create
a "safe harbor" for manufacturers that has long been discredited. Minnesota courts have held that a product may still be
defective even if it is an imitation of other manufacturers'
products.7" Indeed, Judge Learned Hand, the sage of economic analysis of tort law, long ago warned against adoption of
industry-wide practices as a standard of care: "[A] whole calling
may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available
devices. It never may set its own test, however, persuasive be its
usages. Courts must in the end say what is required .... .""
This hallowed rule of law may be surreptitiously repudiated
by the adoption of Section 2(b) of the proposed Restatement. An
injured consumer's ability to prove design defect by showing
that the prevailing designs within an industry are inadequate,
simply loses its force when, for reasons of costs, evidentiary
burden, and institutional caution by the courts, consumers may
be limited to introducing designs prevalent within an industry.
Thus, without fully thinking it through, the proposed design
defect test may be resurrecting a long-rejected rule of law.
VII. It's Not Going to Make the World A Safer Place
The proposed Restatement's strict definition of design defect
also conflicts with Rule 407 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence,
which deals with subsequent remedial efforts.77 Indeed, using
the existence of a safer design as the test for defectiveness
actually creates an incentive for manufacturers to forgo developing a safer design. Rule 407 prevents the admission, to prove
78
negligence, of safety measures taken after an injurious event.
In Kalio, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that subsequent

is not susceptible to "a single standardized safety device"), review denied (Minn. Sept. 13,
1991).
75. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 335, 154 N.W.2d 488, 498

(1967) (noting that the existence of a product designed basically in the same manner,
while relevant, could not preclude a finding that due care required an alternative
design).
76. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied sub non. Eastern

Transp. Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
77. MINN. R. EVID. 407.
78. Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987) (citing MINN. R.
EVID. 407).
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remedial measures are sometimes not admissible to prove defect
in design defect cases.79 The well recognized basis for this rule
is that the public is better protected by encouraging manufacturers to correct design flaws.8' As Kallio points out, manufacturers are more likely to do this if the change in the product does
not constitute an admission that the original product was
defective. 8
Subsequent remedial efforts are admissible to show the
existence of a feasible alternative design, unless the manufacturer concedes of the alternative.82 If no such concession is made,
remedial design changes are normally admissible to show the
feasibility of that design. 3 Kallio makes it clear, however, that
to protect the policy of creating incentives to improve defective
designs, the jury must be given a limiting instruction that the
change in design is not a concession of defect.8 4
Section 2(b) of the proposed Restatement simply destroys
Kallio's careful balance. It is unlikely that manufacturers will
make concessions that a reasonable alternative design was
feasible because such concessions would mean, by definition,
that the design actually used was defective. Once evidence of a
feasible design known to the manufacturer is introduced, there
would be no place for Kallio's cautionary instruction because
under Section 2(b), evidence of feasibility of the alternative
design is the precise definition of design defect.8 5
The result ran only be a lack of incentive on manufacturers
to redesign a product they learn has design problems. Since
changing the design will be a concession of defectiveness, the
incentive placed upon manufacturers by Section 2(b) is to ride
out the storm that may arise over any questionable design.

79. Id. at 98.
80. Id. (reasoning that the public is afforded better protection by encouraging
manufacturers to correct perceived design flaws without risk of having those changes
used by a plaintiff as an admission of the product's defects).
81. Id.
82. 1I
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2(b).
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VIII.

It Just Isn't Fair

The Reporters concede that "fairness values" favor increasing the ability of plaintiffs to recover for injuries caused by
products.8 6 Minnesota courts have long embraced the fairness
rationale, holding that enlarging a manufacturer's liability to
those injured by its products "more adequately meets public
policy demands to protect consumers from the inevitable risks
of bodily harm .... "87 The manufacturer is simply in the
better position to bear the cost of injuries and to redistribute
them via the cost of its product. 88
The allocation of a burden of proof or production is not a
legal technicality; it goes to the heart of the question of whether
In Mathew v.
a particular injury should be compensated.
Mills,8 9 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
could recover even though she could not identify which of two
defendants caused her injury. The court reasoned as follows:
[The] placement of the burden of proof is justified by
considerations of fairness. If we were to impose upon an
injured party the necessity of proving which impact in a
chain collision did which harm, we would actually be
expressing a judicial policy that it is better that a plaintiff,
injured through no fault of his own, take nothing.... [I]n
other words, the rule is a result of a choice as to where a loss
due to failure of proof shall fall-on an innocent plaintiff or
on defendants who are clearly proved to have been at
fault.9 °
Obviously, in placing the burden of proving a reasonable
alternative design on the plaintiff, the ALI has determined, in
many cases, where the loss shall fall.
The rationale the Reporters give for placing this burden on
the victim is both contrary to Minnesota law and at odds with
today's society. Citing an earlier article written by themselves,
Professors Henderson and Twerski support the Tentative Draft's

86. Id. § 2 cmt. a.
87. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 330, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500
(1967).
88. See Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Minn. 1982).
89. 288 Minn. 16, 178 N.W.2d 841 (1970).
90. Mathew v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 22, 178 N.W.2d 841, 845 (1970) (citations
omitted).
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proposed evidentiary burden by arguing that consumers "are
more often better risk minimizers than are product sellers with
respect to generic risks involving the inherent design of

products."'" As an example, the Reporters state that the user
of a knife, rather than its manufacturer, is in a better position
to avoid harm caused by a knife's sharp edge. This example is
disingenuously simply. Long ago, Minnesota courts realized that

in an age of increasingly mechanized and mass produced goods,
it is the manufacturer who is "better able to appreciate and
minimize the risk of injury through the production of safer
goods."92 As the court held in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.93 in
light of the "inevitable risks" posed by mass production of
products and complex marketing conditions, the cost of injuries
should be placed upon the manufacturer instead of the
consumer "who possesses neither the skill nor the means
necessary to protect himself adequately from either the risk of
injury or its disastrous consequences.""
Nothing has changed since McCormack was decided in 1967
to suggest that consumers have gained a greater ability to
discern the potential risks of increasingly complex products.
Only by ignoring the manufacturer's place as the best minimizer
of risk can ALI justify its heavy evidentiary burden which, in
many cases, will leave injured victims in what the Eighth Circuit
in Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk9 5 called "an almost hopeless state
of never being able to succeed against a defective designer. '"96
In such instances, "[t] he public interest is little served."97
What's Really Going On?
There is considerable skepticism among sections of the
practicing bar that the proposed Restatement of product liability
IX.

91. Tentative DraftNo. 2, supranote 2, § 2 Reporters' Notes, cmt. a. The thinking
behind this concept is that consumers, knowing that it will be more difficult to recover
if they are injured, will be more careful. It is difficult to ascribe that strategic thinking
to many plaintiffs, for example, the three-year-old child whose severe bums led to the
action described in McCormack.
92. Holm, 324 N.W.2d at 213 (citations omitted).
93. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
94. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500
(1967).
95. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
96. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir. 1982).
97. Id.
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does not reflect a consensus of product liability decisions
throughout the country, but rather today's climate of tort
reform. 9 This skepticism is fueled, and perhaps even justified,
by the fact that Reporters for the proposed Restatement, Professors Henderson and Twerski, have reportedly testified before
Congress in support of federal product liability bills that
restricted consumer rights. 99
With the proposed Restatement, the ALI appears to move
beyond its perceived role as the chronicler of accepted legal
rules. The Reporters arguably have failed to live up to their selfimposed assignment to construct a revision that reflects "a broad
00
consensus view" without "paper[ing] over real differences."'
There is no consensus holding that a plaintiff, to prove design
defect, must prove that a reasonable alternative design exists.
The cases go both ways, reflecting "real differences."'0
It is easy to quibble over the precise holding in any
reported decision. It is clear, however, that the Reporters have
either misread or misstated the meaning of Kalio to support
their position. The Reporters state that "[a] fair reading of
Minnesota law is that for the majority of design defect cases,
proof of a reasonable alternative is necessary."0 2 The Reporters also cite Kalio for the proposition that it is the burden of the
The
plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative design. 0 3
Reporters suggest that the only exception to the requirement in
Minnesota is those "rare cases" where the product is so unreasonably dangerous it should be removed from the market rather
than redesigned-the Reporters' exploding cigar.0 4 The clear

98.

See Stewart, supra note 11 at 29.

99. Bruce S. Kaufman, Attorneys Spar Over Restatement (Third) of Torts; ATLA to
Mobilize Opposition to ALl Project, 22 PROD. SAFETY & UABILITY REP. (BNA) 436, 439

(Apr. 22, 1994).
100. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3 at 1529.
101.

See View That PlaintiffHas Burden of ProvingExistence of Safer Alternative Design

Generally 78 A.L.R. 4th 154 (1990). This annotation identifies eight states that do not
require a plaintiff to prove feasible alternative design to establish product defect. Id.
at 158-59. Only six states plus the District of Columbia are identified as requiring proof
of an alternative safe design as a prima facie element of design defect. Three states
hold that it is the burden of the manufacturer to prove that there is no alternative safe
design. Id.
102. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 Reporters' Note, cmt. c.
103. Id. cmt. d.
104. The Reporters cite Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 97 n.8 (Minn.
1987) for this proposition.
-
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suggestion is that, in all but a,few cases, Minnesota requires
plaintiff to show a reasonable alternative to design as a prima
facie element of its case and is subject to summary judgment for
the failure to do so.
In fact, Kalio rejected the very legal principle that the
Reporters suggest it represents. Kallio is an automobile defect
case, not one involving an exploding cigar. Defendants in that
case requested an instruction akin to Section 2 (b), requiring the
plaintiff to prove an alternative design.' ° The supreme court
rejected that instruction, holding that the showing of a reasonable alternative design is never a prima facie element to a design
defect case: "Such evidence is relevant to, and certainly may be
an important factor in, the determination of whether the
product was unreasonably defective. However, existence of a
safer, practical alternative design is not an element of an alleged
defective product design prima facie case."1" 6
Kalio rejected the defendant's requested jury instruction,
now the standard proposed by Section 2(b), because the
instruction tended "to elevate proof of the existence of a feasible
alternative design from a factor properly for jury consideration
to an element of the plaintiff's claim."107 Thus, contrary to
the Reporters' suggestion, Kalio repudiates, rather than
supports, the requirement that a plaintiff prove a reasonable
alternative design as an element of its design defect case.
Because of the suspicions that the ALI's project is really tort
reform in cloak, most attorneys agree that the proposed
Restatement, including Section 2(b), will never achieve the
prominence of its predecessor, section 402A of the Restatement
Second."°8 Indeed, Professor Henderson is reported as acknowledging that the impact of the Restatement (Third) will be minimized because of the great success of the Restatement Second. 0 9
Minnesota should heed these arguments and find that
Restatement (Third), especially Section 2 (b) requiring that plaintiff
prove that an alternative design exists, is simply not the right
legal rule at the right time. The proposed Restatement is patently

105.

Id. at 94.

106. Id. at 97.
107. Id.
108. Kaufman, supra note 99 at 438-39.
109.

Id. at 439.
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unfair to plaintiffs and contradicts too many strands of established Minnesota law. Let's stick with Kallio.
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